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Abstract 
 
 
Thousands of schools around the country have implemented whole-school reform 
programs to boost student performance. This paper uses quasi-experimental methods to estimate 
the impact of whole-school reform on students’ reading performance in New York City, where 
various reform programs were adopted in dozens of troubled elementary schools in the mid-
1990s. This paper complements studies based on random assignment by examining a broad-
based reform effort and explicitly accounting for implementation quality. Two popular reform 
programs—the School Development Program and Success for All—do not significantly increase 
reading scores but might have if they had been fully implemented. The More Effective Schools 
program does boost reading scores, particularly for the poorest students, but only when program 
“trainers” remain in the school and the students are native English speakers. 
 
 
Key words:  Elementary education, whole-school reform, quasi-experimental evaluation.
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Introduction 
Student performance in school districts with concentrated poverty, particularly large city 
districts, is far below student performance in other districts. In Baltimore, New Orleans, and 
Philadelphia, for example, the share of students scoring above a selected level on eighth-grade 
reading and math tests falls more than 50 percent below the state average (Casserly, 2002). Over 
the last decade, whole-school reform programs have been widely used to address this problem. 
This paper draws on the experience of New York City, where various whole-school reform 
programs were adopted in dozens of troubled schools in the mid-1990s. We explore the impact 
of these programs on students’ reading performance. 
Whole-school reform programs, which offer standardized sets of management and 
instructional prescriptions, stand out for two reasons. First, whole-school reform programs focus 
on the school as the unit of improvement, which distinguishes them from strategies that focus on 
system-wide policies and larger governing institutions. Second, these programs address, in a 
coordinated fashion, multiple aspects of school operations, including decision making, resource 
allocation, classroom organization, curriculum and instruction, parental involvement, and student 
support. Traditional school-level interventions usually focus on one of these issues.1   
 Efforts to implement whole-school reform have been accelerating, particularly in urban 
schools that serve disadvantaged and minority students. The Comprehensive School Reform 
Demonstration program (CSRD), enacted by Congress in 1997 and re-authorized in 2002 for 
$260 million, provides grants for schools to adopt “research-based” school-wide reform models. 
Moreover, in the spring of 1998, the New Jersey Supreme Court required hundreds of urban 
schools to implement (and the state to pay for) Success for All (SFA) (Goertz and Edwards, 
1999). In addition, Memphis and Miami, along with New York City, have undertaken ambitious 
efforts to implement whole-school reform models.2  As a result of efforts such as these, 24 
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different whole-school reform models had been adopted in over 8,300 schools nationwide by 
1998 (Herman, et al. 1999). Since then, SFA has been adopted in nearly 1,000 more schools and 
hundreds of schools have initiated whole-school reform efforts through CSRD.  
 The existing scholarly literature does not clearly reveal the effects of whole-school 
reform models on student academic achievement. Barnett (1996) reviews three of the most 
widely disseminated whole-school reform models:  Accelerated Schools (AS), the School 
Development Program (SDP), and SFA. This early assessment concluded that “all three models 
can be implemented as described by their developer without substantial increases in per pupil 
school expenditures,” but that the “evidence for the models’ effects on educational outcomes for 
disadvantaged children is more ambiguous.”  A publication of the National Research Council 
concluded that whole-school reform designs have “achieved popularity in spite rather than 
because of strong evidence of effectiveness” (Ladd and Hansen 1999: 153). 
 More recent contributions to the literature include evaluations of SDP in Prince George 
County, Maryland (Cook, et al. 1999), Chicago (Cook, et al. 1999), and Detroit (Millsap et al. 
2001), two of which randomly select treatment schools. Results from these studies are mixed, 
and suggest that SDP may not consistently result in improved student performance. Another 
study, (Bloom et al. 2001), provides a multi-site, quasi-experimental evaluation of AS, also with 
mixed results. A quasi-experimental evaluation of the New York Networks for School Renewal 
Project (Schwartz, Stiefel, and Kim forthcoming), which draws on the same data sets as this 
study, finds evidence of positive short-term program impacts. In 2001, the United States 
Department of Education funded six studies of whole-school reform models, the results of which 
are not yet available. 
 This article presents results from a quasi-experimental study of whole-school reform 
efforts undertaken in New York City during a three-year period in the mid-1990s. Several 
features of this study help to advance the emerging efforts to assess whole-school reform. 
 3
Perhaps most importantly, the sites examined were part of large-scale efforts to implement 
whole-school reform in many schools, and thus provide evidence about the usefulness of whole-
school reform as a broad school improvement strategy. The schools in the study were not 
identified as evaluation sites prior to model adoption, and thus reflect what is likely to happen in 
large-scale implementation efforts.  
 This study cannot make use of random assignment, a strategy with well-known 
advantages for deriving estimates of program impacts. For several reasons, however, researchers 
cannot rely solely on randomized assignment to evaluate whole-school reform models. Because 
these models involve the whole school, researchers cannot randomly assign individual students 
or teachers within a school. Thus, an experiment must identify a set of schools interested in 
whole-school reform and then randomly deny some of them the opportunity to implement a 
whole-school reform plan. Because of the difficulty of recruiting schools willing to agree to 
these conditions, experimental studies are unlikely to provide precise estimates of program 
impacts.3  More importantly, because studies based on random assignment typically are small in 
scale with active participation by program developers, the treatment schools in these studies 
usually receive more attention than would the average school in any large-scale effort to 
implement whole-school reform. Thus, experimental studies are unlikely to reveal whether 
policies that encourage or mandate whole-school reform in a large number of schools can be 
expected to foster consistent improvement. 
 Because quasi-experimental approaches do not strive to control the implementation 
environment, are less expensive, and allow for the examination of many implementation sites, 
they provide an important complement to experimental studies. The primary challenge in using 
quasi-experimental data to estimate program impacts arises because treatment schools are likely 
to be self selected. If unobserved factors that influence either a school’s decision to adopt a 
whole-school reform or students’ decisions to attend a school that has adopted whole-school 
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reform also influence school and student performance, then cross-sectional comparisons of 
adopting schools with non-adopting schools might provide biased estimates of model impacts. 
Our methodology, which is discussed in a later section, addresses this issue in detail. 
 Our analysis of program impacts focuses on two questions:  (1) What is the cumulative 
impact of a whole-school reform model on student performance from first grade through third 
grade?  (2) What portion of the one-year gain in student performance in the third, fourth, and 
fifth grades is attributable to one of these models?  Several whole-school reform models focus on 
students in early elementary school, and the first question is designed to determine whether 
program impacts coincide with this focus. The second question is designed to determine whether 
these programs continue to boost student performance in later elementary school. 
The paper has four main sections. The first section describes our sample and our data. 
The second section explains our estimation strategy. Using a standard education production 
function, we derive the possible sources of bias in estimating program impacts, explain our 
strategy for eliminating these biases, and show how our data can be used to implement our 
approach. The third section contains our results. We describe our main findings, explore a 
variety of alternative estimation strategies, and address several issues that arise in our earlier 
discussion of methodology. The final section presents conclusions and policy implications.  
 
Data 
The Study Sample  
 
This study examines New York City elementary schools that adopted one of three whole-
school reform models during the 1994-95, 1995-96, or 1996-97 school year. These models are 
the School Development Program (SDP), Success for All (SFA), and More Effective Schools 
(MES).4  The schools in the top panel of Table 1 adopted a whole-school reform model in 
response to the New York State Education Department’s (NYSED) registration review program. 
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Under an initiative called Models of Excellence, NYSED facilitated and funded the adoption of 
whole-school reform models in the state’s most troubled schools, called Schools Under 
Registration Review (SURR).5  Adoption of a whole-school reform model was not required, 
however, and many SURRs did not adopt one. Our treatment group includes 24 SURR schools; 
12 that adopted SDP, 9 that adopted MES, and 3 that adopted SFA.6 
In addition, 2 of the 32 Community School Districts (CSD) in New York City undertook 
their own efforts to promote the adoption of whole-school reform. One of these implemented 
SDP in each of its schools in 1994-1995. The other encouraged its elementary schools to adopt 
SFA, and 6 of them did so during the 1995-96 and 1996-97 school years. One school that 
independently adopted MES is also included in the sample. See the second panel of Table 1. In 
all, 47 schools adopted SDP, SFA or MES between the 1994-95 and 1996-97 school years. 
Stratified random sampling was used to select additional schools to serve as a comparison 
group. Beginning with all New York City elementary schools, we dropped schools from CSDs 
facing considerably different service delivery environments than the CSDs in which adopting 
schools are located.7  Next, we created three sampling frames corresponding to the three years in 
which whole-school reform models were adopted. Each frame was split into quartiles based on 
student performance, and an equal number of schools was randomly selected from each quartile. 
The objective of this procedure was to produce a comparison group with a distribution of student 
performance that is reasonably close to the distribution in adopting schools. 8  Overall, 28 schools 
were selected from the 1994-1995 sampling frame, 12 from the 1995-1996 frame, and 12 from 
the 1996-1997 frame. Some schools were selected from more than one sampling frame. In 
addition, we dropped two of the selected schools because they said they had adopted a whole-
school reform model in either 1997-1998 or 1998-1999. The final sample contains 40 
comparison schools.  
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Data Sources 
 Our main data come from individual student data files, called Biofiles, maintained by the 
New York City Board of Education (NYCBOE). We obtained data on all students who were in 
third grade in one of the sample schools during 1994-95, 1996-97, or 1998-99. These data 
include scores on NYCBOE’s city-wide reading tests for each year the student took those exams. 
The NYCBOE did not administer the same test every year, so a simple comparison of test scores 
for different years might not yield an accurate picture of test score gains.9  As shown in the next 
section, however, our estimation procedures do not require exact test score comparability. All 
test results are reported as Normal Curve Equivalents (NCE).10  The NCE measure can be 
interpreted as an equal-interval scale; with a normally distributed performance distribution, a 
gain of five NCEs represents the same amount of improvement at the extreme low (or high) end 
of the distribution as it does for average achievers. Because NCEs form an equal-interval scale, 
they can meaningfully be aggregated and averaged (RMC Research Corporation (RMC), 1976). 
There are 9,586 students in third grade in our sample schools in 1994-95. For those who 
remained in the New York City public school system and were not absent for, or exempted from, 
any tests, the data include test scores for each year from second through fifth grade. For the 
9,932 students in third grade in 1996-97, the data include scores for third through fifth grade. For 
the 10,687 students in third grade in 1998-99, the data provide only third grade scores. The 
availability of test-score data is summarized in Table 2. This table also highlights the three years 
in which whole-school reforms were implemented in various schools (see Table 1). For each 
school in our sample, we observe students in each cohort.  
Other annual information in the Biofiles includes the school the student attended and the 
student’s grade, attendance information, and home zip code. In addition, the data set contains 
each student’s date of birth, gender, ethnicity, home language, and school-lunch eligibility status 
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during the spring of 1999. 11   These student-level files were linked with school-level data 
obtained from NYCBOE’s Annual School Reports and from the NYSED’s Basic Education Data 
System (BEDS). 
Table 3 compares treatment and comparison schools along several dimensions potentially 
related to post-adoption performance. These figures are taken from the year prior to model 
adoption, or in the case of the comparison schools, from the year proceeding the reference year 
used for the earliest sampling frame from which they were selected. This table shows that the 
student bodies of both treatment and comparison schools are almost entirely non-white, with a 
high percentage of students eligible for free lunch, although this percentage is slightly lower for 
SDP schools. MES schools are somewhat larger than the other treatment and comparison schools, 
with a majority of Hispanic students and a much higher share of students with limited English 
proficiency. The last two rows of Table 3 show the percentage of third grade students who 
scored above the statewide reference point (SRP) on the New York State Pupil Evaluation 
Program (PEP) tests in reading and math.12  These pre-adoption performance measures are 
similar across all groups of schools, except that SDP schools show a higher average percentage 
of students above the SRP in third-grade reading. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
While our treatment and control group schools are a fairly close match on observable 
characteristics, important unobservable differences could exist between them. In this section, we 
discuss in detail the strategy we use to control for potential sample selection bias associated with 
such unobservable differences. 
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Educational Production Functions 
 This study draws on the large literature concerning educational production functions, 
such as Ferguson and Ladd (1996). A general form for such a function is 
 
1
1
( )
t T
T t
ijT ijT ijT ijt ijt i j t ijT
t
Y X W X Wα β λ α β µ δ γ ε= − −
=
= + + + + + + +∑ , (1) 
where Y is a test score for student i in school j in year T and X is a set of explanatory variables, 
including both student and school characteristics.13  The variable of interest in this study is W, 
which indicates that a school has implemented whole-school reform. (This variable is discussed 
in more detail below.)  The coefficient of this variable, β, is our measure of program impact. The 
effect of explanatory variables from previous years carries over to year T but degrades at a rate 
given by λ. This form also contains a year fixed effect, γ, and time-invariant fixed effects for the 
student, µ, and the school, δ. The final term represents random error. 
 This production function cannot be estimated in this form because neither the student and 
school fixed effects nor, in most cases, the explanatory variables in previous years can be 
observed. Moreover, estimating it with only observable information, that is, the 
contemporaneous X’s and W, may result in biased estimates because the omitted variables may 
be correlated with the observable variables. 
 The potential bias we are most interested in, of course, involves β. The estimate of β may 
be biased if unobserved characteristics of a school, which are included in δ and in lagged values 
of the school-level X’s, are correlated with the decision to adopt whole-school reform. This type 
of bias is sometimes called self-selection bias because it arises when schools with certain 
unobserved traits are more likely to select reform. In addition, students with certain unobserved 
characteristics, included in µ, or with certain past experiences, included in the lagged values of 
the individual-level X’s, might have a tendency to move to schools in which whole-school 
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reform has been implemented. This type of correlation, along with a correlation between these 
moving decisions and student performance, might also lead to biased estimates of β. 
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Strategies to Eliminate Bias   
 Several methods have been developed to eliminate these potential biases. First, suppose 
that the individual and school fixed effects equal zero. In this case, the test score in a previous 
year can be used to account for the effect of explanatory variables from previous years. 
Specifically, setting µ and δ equal to zero and subtracting λ times YijT-1 from YijT yields a standard 
“value-added” formulation of a production function: 
 1 1 1( ) ( )ijT ijT ijT ijT t t ijT ijTY X W Yα β λ γ λγ ε λε− − −= + + + − + − . (2) 
Note that the expression containing γ serves as a constant term; it captures changes over time in 
the nature of the test or in the average score of participating students. 
A technical problem arises with this equation because the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the component of the error term that has the same time subscript. Some scholars 
call this the problem of “measurement error” in test scores, because the lagged test score may not 
accurately measure the impact of previous Xs. In any case, this correlation can lead to biased 
results. A standard way to eliminate this bias is to use a two-year lagged test score as an 
instrument for the one-year lagged test score.14  Using the subsample for which this approach is 
feasible, we check for the presence of this type of bias in our data. 
Second, suppose that λ equals zero, that is, that the impact of the Xs in previous years 
does not carry over. In this case, we can set λ equal to zero and subtract YijT-1 from YijT to obtain a 
“difference” formulation of a production function, which eliminates µ and δ. This form is: 
 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ijT ijT ijT ijT ijT ijT t t ijT ijTY Y X X W Wα β γ γ ε ε− − − − −− = − + − + − + − , (3) 
where, as before, the expression containing γ serves as the constant term.  
Both of these formulations require two years of data, but the value-added version, 
equation (2), does not require two years of data for the explanatory variables. The value-added 
approach can be applied to two observations after implementation or to one observation before 
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and one after implementation because the impact of explanatory variables in previous years, 
including W, is summarized in the lagged dependent variable. This is not true for equation (3). 
When W is differenced, it equals zero if the program is in place in both years and therefore drops 
out of the analysis. As a result, the difference approach requires at least one observation before 
program implementation and one observation after. With this type of data, equation (3) compares 
the change in test scores in schools that implement the program with the change in test scores in 
schools that did not do so, and therefore provides a “difference-in-difference” estimator.  
 Neither equation (2) nor equation (3) is satisfactory by itself, because neither one 
accounts for both fixed effects (individual and school) and carryover effects through the X 
variables.15  After all, either of these factors could result in biased estimates of β.  One way to 
account for both of these factors is to combine the steps that lead to equations (2) and (3), that is, 
to difference a value-added model without first setting the fixed effects equal to zero. This 
approach requires three years of data. Unfortunately, however, this approach, like equation (3), 
requires pre-implementation information and, in fact, requires two years of data before program 
implementation and one year after. Only a small subset of our data meets these requirements, and 
then is only suitable for answering our second research question.16 
 Another approach, and the one we prefer, is to estimate equation (2) using an 
instrumental-variables (IV) technique that accounts for the potential impact of unobserved school 
characteristics, δ, on the decision to adopt whole-school reform, W.  This approach does not 
address the potential correlation between unobserved individual characteristics, µ, and W; that is, 
it does not eliminate biases that might arise if parental choices about where to live and send their 
children to school are influenced by whole-school reform decisions. To put it another way, our 
approach eliminates bias associated with the whole-school reform adoption decision itself, but 
not from parents’ behavioral responses to this decision. We suspect, however, that few parents 
are even aware of decisions about whole-school reform and that fewer still respond to them. 17 
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To identify instruments for W, we hypothesize that a school will be more likely to adopt a 
given model if other schools in the same district (i.e., CSD) have already done so. The presence 
of other adopting schools in the same district makes it more likely that a school will have 
information on a model, thereby reducing search costs; provides opportunities for jointly 
purchased training, potentially reducing implementation costs; and might enhance the perceived 
professional advantages of adoption.  
Because schools in the same district may draw their students from similar populations 
and use a similar, district-level hiring process, unobserved characteristics of students and 
teachers in schools from the same district might be correlated. This implies that the number of 
schools in the district that have adopted a whole-school reform model may not be an exogenous 
source of variation in a school’s decision to adopt. If, however, the decision of other schools in 
the district is driven primarily by observed characteristics of those schools, then these observed 
characteristics provide suitable instruments. If a school is influenced by the other schools in its 
district, then the observed characteristics of those other schools, which influence their own 
propensity to adopt a whole-school reform model, provide predictors of the initial school’s 
propensity to adopt. Moreover, observed characteristics of other schools are unlikely to have any 
direct influence on student performance in the initial school. Thus, we use the average 
characteristics of other schools in the same district to identify exogenous variation in W. 
Linking Methods to Research Questions 
With our data, a value-added formulation, equation (2), with W treated as endogenous is 
ideal for examining the second research question defined earlier, namely, the impact of whole-
school reform on a student’s progress in grades 3, 4, and 5, each estimated separately. This 
approach is not possible, however, for our first research question, namely, the cumulative impact 
of whole-school reform in the early elementary years, because it requires a pre-grade-one test 
score. Such a score does not exist in our data or in any data set we know of.18 
 13
Fortunately, however, we can answer our first research question using our IV technique 
without the lagged dependent variable, that is, without a value-added specification. This 
technique directly addresses the most likely source of bias in β, namely the correlation between δ 
and program implementation. In addition, this technique is an appropriate method for dealing 
with the potential bias in β that arises if the lagged school-level X’s in equation (1) are correlated 
with W. The exclusion of the lagged dependent variable lowers the explanatory power of the 
regressions and is therefore likely to raise the standard errors of the coefficients, but this variable 
is not required to eliminate self-selection bias in β.19 
We took several additional steps to verify the validity of our IV strategy. First, we used 
over-identification tests to confirm that the instruments used in each regression are not correlated 
with unobserved factors that influence student performance (Woolridge, 2003). Second, we used 
procedures described by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) to verify that our instruments explain a 
significant share of the variation in treatment status. Finally, we used the subset of students for 
whom two or more pre-exposure measures of performance are available to compare our IV 
results with those obtained using a value-added, difference-in-differences estimator. As shown 
earlier, this estimator accounts for all the unobservables in equation (1).  
 The link between our data and our methods is explained in detail in Table 4. The rows of 
this table refer to the substantive research questions we plan to address, namely, the cumulative 
impact of whole-school reform in grades 1 to 3, and the value-added impact of whole-school 
reform in grades 3, 4, and 5. The first two columns indicate the combinations of a student cohort 
and a year of implementation that will be used to answer each question. For example, the 1994-
1995 cohort of students cannot be used to help answer the first question, because, as shown in 
Table 2, the students in that cohort were in grade 3, 4, or 5 when whole-school reform was 
implemented in their school. In the 1996-1997 cohort, on the other hand, students in schools that 
adopted whole-school reform in 1994-1995 experienced whole-school reform starting in the first 
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grade, so they have spent their entire early elementary years in a whole-school reform school by 
the time we observe their third grade scores in 1996-1997. 
 The last two columns of Table 4 indicate the number of treatment schools (for each 
reform model) and the number of observations (i.e. students) in treatment schools available to 
answer each substantive research question. For example, our answer to the first research question 
for SFA will be based on 9 treatment school and 6,570 observations, 885 of which are in 
treatment schools. 
Missing Test Scores and Student Mobility 
Across the three cohorts, approximately 34.2 percent of students are missing at least one 
reading test score.20  The students with missing test scores are more likely than other students to 
be male, to be Asian or Hispanic, to be eligible for free lunch, to speak a language other than 
English at home, to be eligible for ESL services, and to have changed schools. 
Whether or not missing test scores bias estimates of whole-school reform model impacts 
depends on the answers to two questions. The first question is whether or not a student’s 
enrollment in a school that has adopted a whole-school reform model is independently related to 
that student’s having a test score reported. For most of the analyses we conduct, this is not the 
case. Nonetheless, for some cohorts, in some years enrollment in a whole-school reform model 
does show a statistically significant influence on the probability of observing a complete set of 
test scores, even after controlling for other student characteristics. The second question is 
whether or not students with missing test scores would, if they were tested, tend to have different 
scores or score gains than otherwise similar students for whom we do observe test scores. This 
question cannot be answered with our data, so an affirmative answer cannot be ruled out. 
This missing test score issue is compounded by the fact that students in one of our sample 
schools in third grade might have moved to a school outside our sample during or prior to the 
year being examined. For example, 22.5 percent of the cohort in third grade in 1994-95 moved to 
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a school not included in the study sample by fifth grade. Although the data set allows us to 
follow these students into schools outside the study sample, the schools into which these students 
have moved might be substantially different in terms of student-body characteristics, resources, 
and efficiency than the schools that have adopted whole-school reform. Comparison of student 
performance in whole-school reform schools with the performance of students in markedly 
different schools can produce misleading estimates of the impacts of whole-school reform. Thus, 
the primary analyses in this study are conducted using only students who have remained in one 
of the treatment and/or comparison group schools.21  If student mobility rates are different in 
treatment and comparison schools and students who change schools show different rates of 
performance growth, controlling for other differences, then dropping movers from the sample 
could introduce an additional source of bias. 
In sum, excluding students with missing test scores or students who have moved to 
schools outside the study sample may bias estimates of model impacts.22   To address this 
potential bias, we employ a Heckman two-step selection-correction procedure (Heckman 1979). 
To further check the sensitivity of impact estimates to the exclusion of movers, we conduct 
alternative analyses in which movers are included. 
Definition of Treatment 
Schools vary in the success with which they implement a particular model of whole-
school reform.  Moreover, the principles and practices associated with many models have 
diffused beyond the schools that have made an explicit decision to adopt a whole-school reform 
model. Under these circumstances, it is not obvious how to define and measure the intervention 
that whole-school reform represents. 
 The distinction between schools that decide to adopt a whole-school reform model and 
schools that are able to implement that model’s prescriptions is analogous to the distinction 
between individuals assigned to a treatment group and those who actually receive the treatment 
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in randomized experiments (Rouse 1998). As in that case, two approaches are possible. The first 
is to focus on the decision to adopt a reform and the second is to focus on the degree to which the 
specific reform prescriptions are adopted. 
For several reasons, we focus on the impact of the decision to adopt a reform. First, the 
decision to adopt is subject to direct policy control of a school or school district, whereas the 
extent to which policy prescriptions are implemented also reflects the efforts and abilities of 
teachers, other school staff, and even parents. Second, schools that do a good job implementing a 
model may not be representative of either the schools adopting that model or the population of 
schools targeted for future interventions. Thus, focusing on the impact of well-implemented 
model components limits the ability to generalize any findings. Third, the extent to which model 
prescriptions are followed in a school can be difficult to measure. Finally, factors that influence 
the quality of implementation might be more closely related to student performance than are the 
factors influencing the decision to adopt. If so, self-selection biases might be more difficult to 
eliminate when estimating the impacts of model implementation than when estimating the effects 
of the adoption decision.  
If the decision to adopt does not have a large impact on student performance, our basic 
approach cannot distinguish a failure of the model’s prescriptions to improve student 
performance from a failure of treatment schools to consistently implement those prescriptions. 
To help make this distinction, we also estimate whether the impact of W depends on the quality 
of implementation, based on information provided by the program developers. 
The impact of whole-school reform also might depend upon a school’s experience with a 
particular whole-school reform model. Because the extensive organizational changes required by 
whole-school reform may take a number of years to achieve, for example, a finding that student 
performance has not improved after one or two years does not necessarily imply that the program 
has been or will be ineffective. On the other hand, the enthusiasm surrounding initial efforts at 
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school reform might engender short-term gains that are not maintained in later years. To account 
for these possibilities, we determine whether program impacts vary with the length of time a 
school has been implementing a particular reform model. 
Finally, student mobility implies that not all students in a treatment school have been 
exposed to whole-school reform for the same number of years. Our basic results indicate the 
impact of whole-school reform on all the students in treatment schools at a given point in time. 
In fact, however, a reform program’s impact may increase with the length of time a student has 
been exposed to it. To account for this possibility, we also determine whether program impacts 
are influenced by the number of years a student is exposed to a reform program.  
 
Results 
Main Results  
 
Our main results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.23  To illustrate the impact of our 
decision to use IV estimators, these tables (and the following ones) present both OLS and IV 
results. Our discussion will focus exclusively on the IV results.  
Table 5 presents results for our first question, which concerns the cumulative impact of 
whole-school reform in grades one through three. Our preferred results, which appear in the 
fourth column, are based on IV estimation with a Heckman selection correction (Heckman, 
1979). 24  As explained earlier, this procedure controls for the impact that a whole-school reform 
program might have on test scores through its influence on whether or not a score is observed. 
These results indicate that SDP and SFA have small, insignificant impacts, whereas MES has a 
large, positive impact on reading performance. The NCE scale is designed to have a standard 
deviation (SD) of 21.06. Consequently, the point estimate in the fourth column of Table 5 
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implies that three years of exposure to MES raises the average student’s test score by 61.4 
percent of an SD, which is a large impact. 
 The results for question two, concerning value-added impacts, are presented in Table 6. 
Our preferred results, which are presented in the second panel, also indicate a positive 
contribution by MES. In particular, MES raises the fourth-grade value-added by 22.7 percent of 
an SD. However, MES does not have a significant impact on fifth-grade value-added. The value-
added impacts for SDP and SFA are small and insignificant for all grades. 
Tables 5 and 6 also present several other sets of results corresponding to alternative ways 
of dealing with the methodological concerns discussed earlier in the paper. The first two columns 
in Table 5 and the first panel in Table 6 present results without a selection correction for students 
who did not leave sample schools. The last two columns in Table 5 and the third panel of Table 6 
present results without a selection correction for all students, including those who moved out of 
sample schools. These results are very similar to our preferred estimates; indeed, they exhibit the 
same pattern of statistical significance and have virtually the same magnitudes. Our results 
clearly are not driven by the way we handle missing test scores or student mobility.  
Another issue is that measurement error in a lagged test score can lead to a correlation 
between the lagged test score and the error term in a value-added specification, and hence might 
result in biased estimates. To deal with this potential problem, we use an instrumental variables 
procedure, with test score lagged two years as the instrument, to estimate our model for the 
subsample with the required data. The results are presented in the fourth panel of Table 6. 
Although the fifth-grade result for SDP changes signs with this procedure, it is still small and 
insignificant, and the fifth-grade results for MES and SFA are very similar to those in the first 
panel of the table. Thus, our results do not appear to be affected by this measurement error.  
Finally, we test the validity of our IV procedure by comparing its results with the results 
of more precise procedures that combine the value-added and differencing approaches. As 
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explained earlier, this comparison is only possible for a selected subsample of our data. For this 
subsample, Table 7 shows that our procedure (VA-IV) provides estimates of fifth-grade, value-
added impacts similar to those obtained from more precise approaches (D-VA and D-VA-IV).25  
Thus, our IV procedure appears to provide sufficient protection against selection bias.  
Do Impacts Vary with Student Characteristics? 
 The impact of whole-school reform may not be the same for all types of students. 
Exploration of this type of variation in model impacts is crucial to identify the types of schools 
and students for which a particular model is best suited. We investigate whether model impacts 
depend on ethnicity, poverty, or English proficiency. Our results are presented in Table 8.  
 For SDP, we can reject the hypothesis that the cumulative impact of whole-school reform 
through grade three is the same for black and Hispanic students. We can also reject the 
hypothesis that these two groups have the same value-added impact in fourth grade. In both cases, 
however, the underlying estimates of program impact are not statistically significant. 
 Some stronger results appear for MES. As shown in the second panel of Table 8, MES 
has a significant positive impact for poor students (as measured by eligibility for a free lunch) 
and an insignificant negative impact for non-poor students. In addition, MES has a large, positive, 
significant impact on the performance of native speakers but a much smaller, insignificant 
impact on students who speak English as a second language. The difference between these 
results is statistically significant. Overall, MES is successful in overcoming the disadvantages 
associated with poverty but not those associated with a need to learn English. 
 The third panel of Table 8 provides results for SFA. None of the results in this panel 
indicate significant differences in program impacts for different types of students. 
Do Impacts Depend on Program Implementation? 
The results above indicate that SDP and SFA did not have consistent, positive impacts on 
student performance. Because these estimates focus on the impact of the decision to adopt one a 
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these models, it remains unclear whether the lack of positive impacts is due to a failure of the 
model’s prescriptions to improve student performance or from a failure of treatment schools to 
consistently implement those prescriptions.   
To study the impact of implementation for SDP and SFA, we collected extensive 
implementation data from the program developers. These data were used to develop measures of 
overall implementation quality at adopting schools, and to distinguish cases in which 
implementation was relatively successful from cases in which implementation was less 
successful. We could not obtain comparable information for MES, and these data did not cover 
all SDP schools. The implementation measure for SDP is an average of the program developer’s 
ratings for school planning and management team effectiveness, mental health team 
effectiveness, parent team effectiveness, and comprehensive school plan effectiveness (Emmons, 
1999). In the case of SFA, the implementation measure averages the program developer’s 
estimates of success in assessment and regrouping, tutoring for reading, staff development and 
support, early learning, and curriculum.26   
To determine if program impacts depend on the degree of implementation, we interact the 
treatment variable with the quality of implementation variable, expressed as a deviation of the 
sample mean for schools in a given year.27  A positive sign for this interaction term indicates that 
treatment impact increases with implementation quality. We only present OLS estimates of this 
impact because our instrumental variable strategy is not appropriate for this analysis. First, the 
SDP schools for which we have implementation ratings are all from the same district, 
undermining the usefulness of our instruments which are based on district characteristics. 
Moreover, we do not have any new instruments to deal with the potential endogeneity of 
implementation quality. As argued above, our instruments have a clear conceptual link to the 
decision to adopt a whole-school reform program, but they do not have a strong conceptual 
connection to implementation quality. After all, the factors determining which schools adopt a 
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whole-school reform model are not necessarily the same as those determining which schools 
successfully implement that model. 
Our results are presented in Table 9. We find that cumulative program impacts do 
increase with implementation quality. This result is significant at the 5 percent level for SFA and 
at the 10 percent level for SDP. Although the content of the implementation indexes is somewhat 
different for the two programs, the point estimate is virtually the same:  a one-point increase in 
either index boosts the cumulative impact by about 16.6 percent of the SD in the test scores 
(3.5/21.06). This result does not imply, however, that the impacts of these models would have 
been large if they had been implemented well, because the average implementation rating was 
quite high already. Out of maximum of 4.0, the average ratings for SDP are 3.412 in 1997 and 
3.552 in 1999. The average SFA ratings for the same two years, which have a maximum of 5.0, 
are 3.101 and 4.000, respectively. Thus, bringing all SFA schools up to the maximum 
implementation rating, which obviously would be difficult to accomplish, would boost test 
scores by about one-third of a SD in 1997 and one-fifth of a SD in 1999.28  A comparable 
improvement in implementation for SDP would have a smaller impact, less than one-seventh of 
an SD. 
Because our implementation measures are exploratory and because these regressions are 
not estimated with an IV procedure, these results are no more than suggestive. With this caution 
in mind, they indicate that implementation matters and that these two programs are unlikely to 
have substantial benefits unless implementation is virtually perfect. This finding reinforces the 
value of quasi-experimental studies, which are more likely than studies based on random 
assignment to observe schools with a range of implementation ratings.  It may also explain why 
SFA and SDP have significant impacts in some small studies, which can carefully control 
implementation, but not in New York City, where implementation was difficult to control.  
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Do Model Impacts Vary with Length of Time Exposed? 
As explained earlier, the impact of a whole-school reform program may change as a 
school gains experience implementing it or as students are exposed to it for a greater length of 
time. Our data set is ideal for exploring these possibilities. In many cases, we observe the 
performance on the same test in the same treatment schools for students in different cohorts. 
Moreover, because of student mobility, we always observe (except in the first year a program is  
implemented) students in treatment schools with different years of exposure to a reform program. 
In the case of school experience, we can determine whether the two years separating 
cohorts, which corresponds to two more years of experience with whole-school reform in 
treatment schools, boosts program impacts. In schools that implemented whole-school reform in 
1995-96, for example, we observe fourth-grade test scores in 1995-96, when these schools had 
one year of experience with the program, and in 1997-98, when they had three years of 
experience. Our approach is to compare the program impacts in these two years.  
Our results are presented in Table 10. The first panel presents results for cumulative 
impacts. The first two columns apply to schools with one or two years experience and the second 
two columns apply to schools with three or four years experience.29 The results are striking. For 
every reform model, the cumulative impact is larger for schools with fewer than three years of 
experience than for schools with three or more years of experience. Because these cumulative 
impacts are based on third-grade test scores, however, students in schools implementing for 
fewer than three years have not been exposed to the reform program for their entire early 
elementary education. Consequently, the results in the first two columns differ from those in the 
next two columns both because the schools have less experience with reform and because the 
students have less exposure to it. Because these results mix school experience and student 
exposure, they cannot be interpreted without examining whether performance gains are 
influenced by the length of time a student has been exposed to a reform program. 
 23
Our procedure for studying student exposure is to interact the treatment variable with the 
number of years the student has been exposed to the reform program. This procedure yields a 
separate estimate of program impact for each length of exposure. To ensure that our results do 
not reflect differences in each school’s experience implementing whole-school reform, we base 
this analysis only on schools with three or four years experience with a reform program. 
The results are presented in Table 11. As shown in the first panel of this table, we find 
some significant differences in the cumulative impacts of whole-school reform through third 
grade based on student exposure. For SDP, we obtain the curious result that the program has 
significant, positive impact for students exposed for a single year. Indeed, this impact is larger 
than the impact for students exposed from two to four years. However, this result is only 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
For MES, we find that more exposure appears to indicate a larger cumulative impact. The 
impact is about the same for students exposed for one or two years, but is larger for student 
exposed for three years, and larger still for students exposed for four years, which implies that 
they entered the program in kindergarten. The results for three and four years of exposure are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (and significantly different from each other). These 
results suggest that more years of exposure leads to a greater program impact. 
Considering the results of Tables 10 and 11 together, leads to a more complete 
explanation. In the case of SDP, the only significant impacts arise with limited student exposure 
(Table 11) and the combination of limited student exposure and limited school experience (Table 
10). Taken literally, these results indicate that the gain from limiting student exposure to SDP is 
magnified by limiting the school’s experience with SDP.  It is as if the program generates some 
initial enthusiasm, on the part of both students and schools, that has a significant impact on 
student performance, but this enthusiasm (and its performance impact) fades as contact with the 
program continues. 
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In contrast, the MES results in Tables 10 and 11 seem to work in opposite directions. 
Table 11 indicates that program impacts increase with student exposure, whereas Table 10 
indicates that program impacts are greatest when school experience is lowest, despite the fact 
that limited school experience coincides with limited student exposure. A plausible interpretation 
of this result is suggested by a key feature of MES implementation in the New York City schools. 
Specifically, the people who developed MES sent trainers into the schools that adopted MES. In 
addition to providing initial instruction on the model’s precepts, these trainers visited schools 
weekly to assist the school planning team in administering school surveys, analyzing survey and 
performance data, and conducting school planning processes. These trainers were present in the 
MES schools during 1995-96 and 1996-97, but were not present in any of the MES schools in 
1997-98 or 1998-99.30   This timing coincides with the categories in Table 10. In particular, 
when schools are observed with fewer than two years experience (in 1996-1997), they still have 
the trainers present, but the trainers have left by the time they are observed with three or four 
years experience (in 1998-1999). Thus, it is the presence of the MES trainers, not a lack of 
school experience, which probably generates the positive impact of MES on student performance.  
This timing also coincides with the categories in Table 11. Recall that the results in this 
table are based only on tests taken once schools have three or four years of experience with MES. 
Because MES was not adopted in any schools in 1994-95, this implies that the MES results in 
this table are based exclusively on third-grade tests taken in 1998-99. Students with one or two 
years exposure to MES in this subsample entered an MES school in 1997-98 or 1998-99 and 
therefore attended the MES schools only after MES trainers had left. Furthermore, students with 
three years exposure to MES entered in 1996-97 and overlapped with the MES trainers for one 
year and students with four years exposure entered in 1995-96 and overlapped with the MES 
trainers for two years. The results in Table 11 indicate, therefore, that the impact of MES is not 
statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) without trainers, and that exposure to the trainers 
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for two years has a larger impact than exposure to the trainers for one year. In short, the impact 
of MES increases with student exposure, but only if trainers are involved. 
Table 10 also explores the impact of school experience on the value-added impact of the 
three programs. As shown in the second and third panels of this table, no clear patterns emerge. 
The point estimates indicate that SFA has a negative impact in both fourth and fifth grades when 
it is first implemented, but these results are not statistically significant. Indeed, the only 
significant impact is for MES in schools with fewer than two years experience. The estimated 
MES impact is larger for schools with three or four years experience, but it is not significant. 
These value-added impacts for MES may be harder to sort out than the cumulative impacts 
because the categories no longer have a clear link to the MES trainer issue; in fact, all the 
schools in the value-added regressions have trainers for at least one year.31 
 The second panel of Table 11 hints that the value-added impact of whole-school reform 
actually declines with student exposure to the program. Indeed, the point estimates are consistent 
with this view for all three reform models. The results in this panel are not statistically 
significant, however. The regressions on which these results are based pool fourth and fifth grade 
test scores to ensure that there are enough students in each experience category to make the 
estimation feasible. Even with this pooling, however, we are unable to identify any significant 
impact of student exposure on programs’ value-added impact.  
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
States around the country are now implementing school report cards and other 
accountability systems that are based on student test scores (Goertz and Duffy 2001). This 
growing emphasis on student performance in education policy implies that test score data are 
becoming more widely available. This type of data provides an opportunity for scholars to use 
quasi-experimental methods to evaluate whole-school reform programs and other educational 
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innovations. Because evaluations of this kind provide a valuable complement to studies based on 
random assignment, we hope, along with Schwartz, Stiefel, and Kim (forthcoming), that many 
scholars will take advantage of this opportunity. 
The quasi-experimental evaluation in this paper reveals that the extensive efforts to 
implement whole-school reform in New York City have met with mixed success. To begin, we 
find no evidence that Success for All boosted elementary reading test scores in New York City. 
This result may surprise some readers because SFA focuses on reading and because some 
previous studies have found evidence of positive impacts from SFA (Herman, et al. 1999). 
Nevertheless, we find that SFA does not have a substantial or statistically significant impact on 
either cumulative student performance in grades one through three or on value-added to student 
performance in grades three, four, or five. 
We also find that the cumulative impact of SFA on student performance in grades one 
through three depends on the quality with which the SFA prescriptions are implemented. It 
follows that SFA’s cumulative impact might have been larger if the program had been better 
implemented. The average implementation rating of the SFA schools was quite high, however, 
so our estimates imply that the cumulative impact of SFA would still not have been very large 
except in the unlikely event that every school exactly followed all of SFA’s prescriptions. 
The results for the School Development Program also are discouraging. Although our 
point estimates indicate that SDP has a more positive impact on reading scores than does SFA, 
its impacts are also small and statistically insignificant. We also obtain similar implementation 
results for SDP as for SFA. Better implementation would boost SDP’s cumulative impact over 
grades one through three, it appears, but our results imply that even with complete 
implementation, the cumulative impact of SDP would be small. 
In contrast, we find that More Effective Schools has a large and statistically significant 
impact on cumulative student performance in grades one through three and on the value added to 
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student performance in grade four. Indeed, we find that MES raises reading test scores by 84.1 
percent of a standard deviation over the first four years of school, which is a surprisingly large 
impact. Moreover, MES appears to be more effective for poor students than for non-poor 
students, a characteristic of great value in an inner-city setting. It also appears to be more 
effective for native English speakers, both black and Hispanic, than for students who speak 
English as a second language. 
One key feature of MES is that the program developers send trainers to work with each 
adopting school for the first couple years of implementation. We find that these trainers play a 
key role; in fact, the large, positive impact of MES disappears when the MES trainers stop 
coming. This is, of course, a discouraging result. It suggests that schools have difficulty 
maintaining the positive impact of MES on their own. Because the trainers require spending 
beyond the standard payments for school teachers and administrators, this result indicates that 
whole-school reform may not be able to boost student performance unless it is accompanied by a 
significant increase in resources for more or better-trained personnel. 
Overall, these results highlight the challenges facing poor, inner-city schools. We find 
evidence that whole-school reform may have a role to play in boosting student reading 
performance in these schools. Nevertheless, this potential contribution is undermined by key 
characteristics of these schools including: lack of resources; limited management and teaching 
skill, which lead to poor program implementation and the need for outside “trainers;” a 
concentration of students with limited English proficiency, and high student mobility. Further 
experiments with, and evaluations of whole-school reform models are clearly warranted, but 
nobody should expect this approach to be a panacea for poor, inner-city schools. 
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1.  For a concise summary of several different models see NWREL (1998). 
   
2.  Lacking clear evidence of program success based on its own evaluation, Memphis 
eventually cancelled its whole-school reform program. See Viadero (2001). 
 
3. The largest number of schools in an experimental study is 23, including 13 School 
Development Program (SDP) schools, in Cook et al. (1999). Cook, Hunt and Murphy 
(1998) examine 19 schools, including 10 SDP schools. In addition to small scale, studies 
based on random assignment, also face a threat from teacher movement in or out of 
schools that adopt a reform model. 
  
4. For brief descriptions of SDP and SFA see Barnett (1996) or NWREL (1998). For more 
complete descriptions see Comer, Haynes and Joyner, 1996 and Slavin et al., 1996. For a 
description of MES see the Association for Effective Schools, Inc. website at 
http://www.mes.org. 
 
5.  During the period examined by this study, a school was identified for registration review 
if it fell below any of the following criteria and showed a three-year pattern of decline on 
a criterion it failed to meet. The criteria, based on the state’s Pupil Evaluation (PEP) tests, 
were 65 percent of students scoring above the state reference point (SRP) in third grade 
reading, 65 percent above the SRP in sixth grade reading, 85 percent above the SRP on 
eighth grade reading, 75 percent above the SRP in third grade math, and 75 percent above 
the SRP in sixth grade math. 
 
6. Several schools in the control group are also SURR schools. See Table 4. 
7.  These districts serve few poverty students in comparison with districts that have adopting 
schools, and in the typical year, do not have any schools with aggregate levels of 
performance that fall below the state criteria used to identify SURR schools (see endnote 
5).  
 
8.  We identify schools in which 55 percent or fewer students score above the SRP on the 
third grade PEP reading test or 70 percent or fewer students score above the SRP on the 
third grade PEP math test. A school had to meet this criterion in each of the three years 
before the relevant adoption year to be in the sampling frame. These criteria are similar to 
those defining SURRs (endnote 5), which helps ensure that they will yield a comparison 
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group with a distribution of pre-adoption performance similar to that in the treatment 
schools. 
 
9. Different tests measure different dimensions of reading performance and may use 
different norming procedures and samples. In 1994-1995 the NYCBOE used Degress of 
Reading Power, a test of reading comprehension developed by Touchstone Applied 
Science Associates. In 1995-1996, NCYBOE switched to a reading test published by 
CTB/McGraw-Hill, and in 1998-1999 began to use the reading component of the 
TerraNova CAT. 
 
10. The NCE is a test scoring metric developed to facilitate measurement of the effectiveness 
of Title I compensatory education programs. NCEs are normalized standard scores with a 
mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 21.06. 
 
11. Free-lunch eligibility indicators were imputed for 15.8 percent of the students in the study 
sample that are missing this information. Details on the imputation procedure used, and 
other aspects of the data assembly for this study are available from the authors upon 
request.  
 
12. The PEP test and associated SRP, which is a minimum competency standard, were used 
until 1998-1999 to identify students for remedial assistance. Our data set includes PEP 
scores, but only at the school level, so we cannot use them in our empirical analysis. 
  
13. The combination of school-level and individual-level variables in any production 
function study, including ours, calls for the use of robust standard errors. As a result, all 
of our standard errors are calculated using the “cluster” option in STATA, which makes 
use of a generalization of the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance. 
 
14. Schwartz, Stiefel, and Kim (forthcoming) deal with this problem by including both a one- 
and a two-year lagged values of test scores in the equation. This approach does not 
eliminate the correlation that causes the problem. 
   
15.  More technically, subtracting λ times equation (1) for T-1 from equation (1) results in an 
equation (2) with two new terms on the right side, namely, µi(1-λ) and δj(1-λ). 
Subtracting equation (1) for T-1 from equation (1) results in an equation (3) with the 
following new terms on the right side:  ST-1(λ-1)+λ(αXijT-1 + βWijT-1), where St is the 
sum in equation (1) for year t.  
 
16. A later section describes how we use this subset. As discussed below, pre-implementation 
test scores are rarely, if ever, available for studies of program impacts in early elementary 
school. 
 
17. Schwartz, Stiefel, and Kim make a similar argument (page 14 of manuscript, endnote 10):  
“Students or their parents are unlikely to have known about this reform before enrolling 
(or even after enrolling).” 
 
18.  State-administered tests typically are not given in kindergarten or first grade because test-
taking skills generally have not been developed by that age. The lack of these tests is 
therefore an inherent constraint facing research on whole-school reform. 
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19. As before, this IV technique does not rule out the possibility of bias from a correlation 
between µ and parental decisions about where to send their children to school. In this case 
it also does not rule out bias from a correlation between these decisions and lagged 
individual characteristics in X. For the reasons given earlier, however, it seems likely that 
both of these correlations and the resulting bias are close to zero. 
 
20. The percentage of students missing the test scores needed for the specific analyses 
presented here is less than these figures, and varies by cohort and school year. 
 
21. A small number of students in each cohort moved from one sample school to another 
school that is also in the sample. These students are included in the primary analyses. Our 
approach contrasts with that of Schwartz, Stiefel, and Kim (forthcoming), who retain in 
their sample all students who remained in any New York City school. 
 
22. Schwartz, Stiefel, and Kim (forthcoming) do not correct for this potential selectivity 
problem. Because they include movers in their regressions, the selectivity problem in 
their case arises solely because some test scores are missing.  
 
23. These tables, along with the others in the text, focus on results for the whole-school 
reform variables. The full list of control variables is provided in Appendix Table A1, 
which presents full results for the fifth-grade, value-added regressions with a Heckman 
selection correction. Results for any other regression in this paper are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
24. In particular, we estimate an equation to predict the probability that a student will have all 
test information, and then insert the resulting selection-correction term into our student-
performance regression. Results for this equation, which is estimated with probit analysis, 
are presented in Table A1. Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the Heckman selection term 
(called lambda or the inverse Mills ratio) is not significant in the fifth-grade regressions. 
Moreover, it is significant in only one of the IV regressions. It is significant, however, in 
most of the OLS regressions. 
 
25. The value-added, difference-in-difference approach does not account for the possibility 
that schools or students have unobserved time trends in their test scores and that these 
trends might be correlated with model adoption. These trends, which are not included in 
equation (1), can be accounted for with double differencing. See Bloom (1984). We do 
not have enough data to implement this approach, but the D-VA-IV model in Table 7 is a 
step in this direction. 
 
26. These ratings come from unpublished surveys supplied to us by the program developers. 
More information on the implementation ratings for SDP and SFA is available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
27. This formulation implies that the estimated impact of W alone is still an estimate of the 
average impact of that model. This estimate differs from the estimates in Tables 5 and 6, 
however, because it is based on a slightly different sample (implementation data are not 
available for all SDP schools) and because the implementation rating is expressed as a 
difference from the school mean not from the student mean. 
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28. In 1997, raising all districts to the maximum score would raise the average from 3.101 to 
5.000, a change of 1.899. Multiplying this change by the point estimate, 3.499, yields an 
increase in the average test score of 6.645. Finally, adding the coefficient of W and 
dividing the result the test-score SD, 21.06 yields the result in the text. A comparable 
calculation leads to the other results in the text and also indicates that the impact of SFA 
on fifth-grade value-added is negative even with perfect implementation (see the last 
column of Table 9).  
 
29. We also observe cumulative impacts and fifth grade impacts for 25 SDP schools with five 
years experience. These estimates, which apply to schools that implemented SDP in 
1994-95, are all small and insignificant and are omitted to simplify the presentation. We 
also observe two SFA schools with five years experience, but that is not enough to obtain 
reasonable estimates. 
 
30. This information on MES implementation comes from our interviews with school 
personnel. 
 
31.  Because many of these value-added results are based on a small number of schools, we 
also estimated school-experience regressions that pooled fourth and fifth grade test scores. 
This approach makes it possible to include all treatment schools but also implies that 
fourth-grade test score gain for 1994-95 cohort (when the school has limited experience 
with a program) is sometimes compared to the fifth-grade test score gain for the 1996-97 
cohort in the same school when it has more experience. With this approach, the negative 
impact in SFA schools with limited experience is statistically significant, but only at the 
10 percent level. No other results are statistically significant. These results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Whole-School Reform Model Adopters Included in the Study Sample 
 
      
  Number Adopting in 
 Model 
Total 
Number of 
Adopters Fall 1994 Fall 1995 Fall 1996 
      
SDP 12 9 1 2 
MES 9 0 6 3 
SFA 3 2 0 1 
SURR Adopters 
Total 24 11 7 6 
      
SDP 16 16 0 0 
MES 1 0 0 1 
SFA 6 0 4 2 
Other Adopters 
Total 23 16 4 3 
      
SDP 28 25 1 2 
MES 10 0 6 4 
SFA 9 2 4 3 
Total Adopters 
Total 47 27 11 9 
      
SDP=School Development Program; MES=More Effective Schools; SFA=Success for All 
 
 
 
  
Table 2.  Available Test Scores in NYC Data, by Cohort 
 
 
School Year 
                                    Years of Program Implementation 
 
Student 
Cohort 
1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
 
1994-95 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
  
 
1996-97    3 4 5 
1998-99      3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.  Means and Standard Deviations for Schools in the Study Samplea 
  
 Adopters Comparison 
 SDP MES SFA Schools 
     
Number of schools 28 10 9 40 
Number of SURR schoolsb 15 9 5 15 
Enrollment 753 [273] 1050** [348] 886 [242] 751 [300] 
% asian 0.6 [0.9] 1.0 [1.0] 1.5 [1.4] 0.8 [1.4] 
% black 67.4** [28.5] 32.7** [29.0] 60.2 [18.8] 51.6 [30.1] 
% hispanic 30.0** [27.1] 64.8** [29.2] 37.0 [17.4] 45.5 [28.6] 
% white 1.8 [2.9] 1.4 [3.1] 0.9 [0.9] 1.9 [4.0] 
% limited English proficient 13.6 [13.1] 32.8** [23.2] 19.1 [13.3] 18.5 [14.5] 
% eligible for free lunch 87.8** [8.4] 93.7 [6.6] 94.1 [5.8] 91.8 [7.6] 
Average class-size 27.4 [2.5] 28.4 [3.6] 27.4 [3.1] 27.6 [2.6] 
% teachers <2 years experience 12.1 [7.1] 12.1 [4.5] 7.9 [5.7] 11.1 [7.8] 
% teachers certified in field of assignment 79.5 [9.9] 76.3 [9.9] 90.1* [6.5] 80.6 [12.6] 
% above SRP on grade 3 PEP reading 51.9* [16.2] 45.7 [14.7] 46.9 [11.8] 46.5 [13.8] 
% above SRP on grade 3 PEP math 78 [11.6] 83.4 [7.6] 80.7 [5.7] 80.3 [7.8] 
a. Reported averages [and standard deviations] are for the last year prior to program adoption.  In the case of 
comparison schools, figures are from the year preceding the reference year used to define the earliest sampling frame 
from which the school was selected; * Indicates significantly different than the comparison group mean at the 0.10 
significance level;   ** Indicates significantly different than the comparison group mean at the 0.05 significance level. 
b. Counts all schools that have been designated as a registration review school at any time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Sources of Data for Key Questions 
 
Sources of Data Data Description 
 
 
 
 
 
Cohorts of 
Students 
 
 
 
 
Implementation Years 
 
Number of Treatment 
Schools (Model) 
Number of 
Observations 
in Treatment 
(Comparison) 
Schools 
Question 1: 
Cumulative Impact 
    
1996-97 1994-95 28 (SDP) 3,353 [5,685] 
10 (MES) 855 [5,685] 
   Grades 1 
   through 3 1998-99 1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
9 (SFA) 
 
885 [5,685] 
Question 2:  
Value-Added Impact 
    
25 (SDP) 1,827 [2,771] 
0 (MES) 0 
   Grade 3 1994-95 1994-95 
2 (SFA) 0 
28 (SDP) 3,483 [5,993] 1994-95 1994-95 
1995-96 
10 (MES) 1,511 [5,993] 
   Grade 4 
1996-97 1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
9 (SFA) 1,208 [5,993] 
28 (SDP) 3,156 [5,105] 1994-95 1995-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
10 (MES) 1,794 [5,105] 
   Grade 5 
 
1996-97 1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
9 (SFA) 1,288 [5,105] 
 
 
  
 
TABLE 5.  Estimates of the Cumulative Impact of Whole-School Reform Through Grade 3, 
 Using Alternative Samples and Specificationsa 
 
  
Basic Estimates 
With Heckman Selection 
Correctionb 
 
Including Moversc 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
SDP 1.144 2.333 1.141 2.340 0.980 2.033 
 [1.437] [2.235] [1.427] [2.236] [1.339] [2.138] 
MES 2.878** 12.939** 2.819** 12.933** 2.660** 11.399** 
 [1.437] [3.601] [1.437] [3.602] [1.291] [3.639] 
SFA 1.047 0.443 1.098 0.382 0.506 0.679 
 [1.291] [2.794] [1.295] [2.799] [1.149] [2.615] 
       
a. Estimates are each drawn from separate regressions controlling for several student and school 
characteristics.  See Appendix Table A1.  Figures in brackets are robust standard errors 
b. Heckman selection correction procedure used to account for fact that the sample of students used to 
estimate model impacts, namely students who have required tests scores and who remain in treatment 
or comparison group schools, is a non-random selection of all students originally in the treatment and 
comparison group schools.  The selection term is significant for entries in bold.  
c. Sample includes students with required test scores who moved out of a treatment or comparison group 
school to another New York City school.  Students in a school that is not part of the treatment group or 
the original comparison group are counted as part of the comparison group. 
 
 
TABLE 6.  Estimates of the Value-Added Impact of Whole-School Reform, Grades 3, 4, and 5, Using 
Alternative Samples and Specificationsa 
 
 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Basic Estimates 
SDP 1.750 1.118 -0.782 0.955 0.028 0.542 
 [1.609] [1.948] [0.592] [1.024] [0.724] [1.234] 
MES   0.589 4.924** -0.010 -0.477 
   [0.865] [1.973] [0.650] [1.742] 
SFA   0.418 -0.032 -2.247** -2.093 
   [1.002] [1.549] [0.622] [1.984] 
With Heckman Selection Correctionb 
SDP 1.726 1.166 -0.784 0.966 0.025 0.535 
 [1.603] [1.942] [0.589] [1.027] [0.717] [1.174] 
MES     0.632 4.782** -0.011 -0.425 
    [0.850] [1.961] [0.631] [1.752] 
SFA     0.471 0.044 -2.170** -1.990 
    [1.006] [1.534] [0.610] [1.969] 
Including Moversc  
SDP 1.750 1.118 -0.732 1.040 -0.078 0.955 
 [1.609] [1.948] [0.584] [1.033] [0.651] [1.127] 
MES     0.673 4.858** -0.017 -0.067 
    [0.841] [1.722] [0.605] [1.746] 
SFA     0.388 -0.567 -2.213** -3.916* 
    [0.986] [1.639] [0.573] [2.150] 
With Measurement Error Correctiond 
SDP     -0.483 -0.255 
     [0.707] [1.216] 
MES     -0.454 -0.670 
     [0.641] [1.670] 
SFA     -2.169** -1.980 
     [0.616] [2.046] 
a. Estimates are each drawn from separate regressions controlling for several student and school 
characteristics.  See Appendix Table A1.  Figures in brackets are robust standard errors. 
b. Heckman selection correction procedure used to account for fact that the sample of students used to 
estimate model impacts, namely students who have required tests scores and who remain in treatment 
or comparison group schools, is a non-random selection of all students originally in the treatment and 
comparison group schools.  The selection term is significant for entries in bold.  
c. Sample includes students with required test scores who moved out of a treatment or comparison group 
school to another New York City school.  Students in a school that is not part of the treatment groups 
or the original comparison group are counted as part of the comparison group. 
d. Two-year test score lag is used as an instrument for the lagged-dependent variable, in order to correct 
for potential measurement error.  A sufficient sample of observations with two-year test score lags is 
available only for fifth graders. 
 
 
Table 7.  Comparison of Methods for Estimating Impact of Whole-School Reform on 
 5th Grade Reading Scores 
 
  D-VA D-VA-IV VA VA-IV LEV LEV-IV 
More Effective Schools -0.494 1.512 0.261 2.902 0.074 2.612 
 [0.97] [1.51] [0.91] [2.12] [1.25] [2.38] 
         
Success for All -3.602** -2.275** -2.595** -2.490** -3.212** -3.197* 
  
[1.09] [1.02] [0.77] [0.96] [1.61] [1.76] 
N 4,483 4,483 4,483 4,483 4,483 4,483 
R-squared 0.092 0.089 0.581 0.579 0.143 0.141 
Figures in brackets are robust standard errors; * = significant at the 0.10 level; ** = significant at the 0.05 
level.  D = difference-in-difference, VA = value-added, IV = instrumental variable, LEV = simple level 
regression. Regressions based on students in 1994-95 cohort who attended schools that implemented 
whole-school reform in 1995-96 or 1996-97 or appropriate comparison schools.  Regressions include a full 
set of control variables, plus a Heckman selection correction.  See Appendix Table A1. 
TABLE 8.  Variation in the Estimated Impact of Whole-School Reform by Student Characteristicsa
 
    Cumulative Impact Value-Added Impact 
  Through Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
SDP Not Free-Lunch Eligible 5.320* 7.275* 0.266 0.464 -1.019 -0.584 
  [2.941] [4.425] [1.034] [1.545] [1.075] [1.302] 
 Free-Lunch Eligible 0.709 2.188 -0.900 1.001 0.146 0.662 
  [1.377] [2.158] [0.590] [1.073] [0.734] [1.293] 
 Statistically Significant Differenceb YES NO NO NO NO NO 
 Not ESL Eligible 1.032 2.724 -0.820 1.055 -0.077 0.630 
  [1.518] [2.275] [0.624] [1.069] [0.756] [1.302] 
 ESL Eligible 2.051 2.491 -0.514 0.089 0.803 -0.333 
  [1.961] [4.079] [1.057] [2.084] [0.940] [1.441] 
 Statistically Significant Differenceb NO NO NO NO NO NO 
 Black 1.053 3.710 -0.811 1.666 -0.187 0.468 
  [1.642] [2.272] [0.674] [1.151] [0.897] [1.493] 
 Hispanic 1.478 -0.240 -0.667 -0.978 0.524 0.839 
  [1.493] [2.753] [0.799] [1.323] [0.666] [1.105] 
  Statistically Significant Differenceb NO YES NO YES NO NO 
MES Not Free-Lunch Eligible -4.055 -3.745 -2.127 4.845 -0.781 -0.040 
  [2.633] [2.868] [1.985] [3.248] [1.139] [5.729] 
 Free-Lunch Eligible 4.175** 12.752** 0.679 4.992** 0.123 -0.562 
  [1.243] [3.405] [0.894] [2.026] [0.660] [1.671] 
 Statistically Significant Differenceb YES YES NO NO NO NO 
 Not ESL Eligible 2.959* 15.947** 0.175 5.051** -0.035 -0.235 
  [1.561] [4.726] [1.068] [2.528] [0.737] [1.899] 
 ESL Eligible 2.554 4.685 0.736 3.696** 0.085 -1.411 
  [1.993] [2.984] [1.119] [1.747] [1.113] [2.234] 
 Statistically Significant Differenceb NO YES NO NO NO NO 
 Black 2.600 7.14* -1.239 5.359 -0.756 -1.960 
  [2.349] [3.703] [1.432] [3.438] [0.936] [3.358] 
 Hispanic 3.327 14.334** 1.032 4.423** 0.421 -0.012 
  [1.379] [4.303] [0.918] [2.048] [0.645] [1.445] 
  Statistically Significant Differenceb NO NO YES NO NO NO 
SFA Not Free-Lunch Eligible -0.804 -5.295 0.768 -1.040 -2.196** -3.180** 
  [2.463] [5.998] [1.718] [3.210] [0.942] [1.367] 
 Free-Lunch Eligible 1.178 1.077 0.382 0.057 -2.252** -1.959 
  [1.289] [2.106] [0.955] [1.607] [0.654] [2.139] 
 Statistically Significant Differenceb NO NO NO NO NO NO 
 Not ESL Eligible 0.795 0.834 0.566 0.053 -2.205** -1.897 
  [1.395] [2.276] [1.165] [1.622] [0.642] [2.123] 
 ESL Eligible 3.287** -0.348 -0.633 -1.196 -2.524* -3.776** 
  [1.614] [4.309] [1.119] [1.581] [1.379] [1.392] 
 Statistically Significant Differenceb NO NO NO NO NO NO 
 Black 0.792 2.278 0.714 0.614 -2.706** -2.184 
  [1.647] [2.897] [1.105] [1.831] [0.702] [2.742] 
 Hispanic 1.919 -0.545 0.110 -1.375 -1.433* -2.030** 
  [1.356] [2.677] [0.928] [1.521] [0.778] [0.977] 
  Statistically Significant Differenceb NO NO NO NO NO NO 
a. Estimates are each drawn from separate regressions controlling for several student and school characteristics.  See Appendix 
Table A1.  Samples used are the same as in Table 6.  Figures in brackets are robust standard errors; * = statistically significant at 
0.10 level; ** = statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
b. This row indicates whether the difference between the preceding two estimates is statistically significant at the 0.10 percent 
level or above. 
 
TABLE 9.  Variation in the Estimated Impact of Whole-School Reform by 
Quality of Model Implementation 
 
 Cumulative Impact 
 
 
Value Added Impacts 
 Through Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 
 OLS OLS OLS 
SDP 0.868 -0.893 -0.149 
 
[1.834] [0.654] [0.957] 
SDP*Implementation Rating 3.574* 0.217 1.825* 
 
[1.996] [0.733] [1.089] 
SFA 0.915 0.867 -2.249** 
 [1.096] [1.147] [0.627] 
SFA*Implementation Rating 3.499** 0.548 0.051 
  [1.230] [2.076] [0.930] 
Estimates are drawn from separate regressions for each program controlling for several student 
and school characteristics.  See Appendix Table A1.  SDP estimates computing using only SDP 
schools with implementation ratings, and SFA results computed only using student outcome 
measures from those years that we have SFA implementation measures (1997-1999), otherwise 
samples are the same as in Table 6.  Figures in brackets are robust standard errors; * = significant 
at 0.10 level; ** = significant at 0.05 level. 
 
TABLE 10.  Variation in the Impact of Whole-School Reform by Number of 
Years Implementing Reform Modela 
 
 Implementing ≤ 2 Years Implementing 3 or 4 Years 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Cumulative Impact Through Grade 3b 
 
SDP 3.211** 6.816** 1.144 2.333 
 [1.466] [2.963] [1.437] [2.235] 
MES 4.332** 19.695** 2.878** 12.939** 
 [1.820] [6.418] [1.437] [3.601] 
SFA -1.095 4.649 1.047 0.443 
 [1.778] [3.305] [1.291] [2.794] 
N (SDP) 2,453 3,253 
N (MES) 1,037 855 
N (SFA) 931 885 
N (COMP) 8,319 5,685 
Value-Added Impact in Grade 4c  
  
SDP -0.971 0.317 -0.173 1.012 
 [0.702] [1.321] [0.878] [1.315] 
MES 1.478 3.781** -0.994 6.038 
 [0.800] [1.536] [1.274] [3.927] 
SFA 0.719 -0.588 1.330 1.766 
 [0.702] [1.440] [1.412] [1.971] 
N (SDP) 1,771 1,579 
N (MES) 671 525 
N (SFA) 518 446 
N (COMP) 2,927 3,006 
Annual Value-Added Impact in Grade 5d  
     
SDP -1.722   2.424  
 [2.022]   [2.403]  
MES -0.012 -2.112 0.372 -0.811 
 [0.878] [2.636] [0.743] [2.279] 
SFA -3.715** -2.164 -1.738 -0.107 
 [0.958] [2.306] [1.077] [2.589] 
N (SDP) 149 152 
N (MES) 926 865 
N (SFA) 511 484 
N (COMP) 2,543 2,562 
a. Estimates are drawn from separate regressions controlling for several student 
and school characteristics.  See Appendix Table A1.  Figures in brackets are 
robust standard errors.  N stands for number of observations; COMP indicates 
comparison groups. 
b. Estimates in this panel are based on all treatment schools. 
c. Estimates in this panel are based on schools that adopted in 1994-95 or 1995-96 
which include 26 SDP, 6 MES and 6 SFA schools. 
d. Estimates in this panel are based on schools that adopted in 1995-96 or 1996-97 
which include 3 SDP, 10 MES and 7 SFA schools.  There were not enough SDP 
schools to implement the IV estimation. 
 
 
TABLE 11.  Variation in Estimated Impact of Whole-School Reform by Number of Years  
Student Has Been Exposed 
 
 SDP MES SFA 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Impact Through Grade 3 
       
One Year 1.901 2.778* 2.058 4.309 0.000 0.566 
 
[1.555] [1.606] [1.847] [2.909] [1.723] [2.084] 
Two Years 0.205 1.084 1.062 3.982* -2.522 -2.338 
 
[1.349] [1.939] [1.460] [2.205] [2.274] [2.408] 
Three Years 0.749 2.552 3.818** 6.427** 0.475 0.799 
 
[1.502] [2.910] [1.428] [1.583] [1.669] [3.303] 
Four Years 1.121 1.335 1.706 15.857** 1.559 0.955 
 
[1.441] [1.852] [2.055] [6.757] [1.440] [1.609] 
N 11,776 8,698 8,768 
Annual Value-added in Grades 4 and 5     
       
One Or Two Years -0.054 1.390 0.581 3.262 0.636 2.110 
 
[0.865] [1.482] [1.015] [2.555] [1.522] [5.235] 
Three Years 0.398 1.023 0.033 0.894 -1.364 -1.469 
 
[1.031] [1.128] [0.817] [1.168] [1.176] [0.992] 
Four Years -0.905 0.043 0.253 1.421 -1.094 -0.852 
 
[1.046] [0.839] [0.832] [1.091] [1.184] [1.262] 
N 11,307 9,417 9,170 
Estimates are based on regressions controlling for several student and school characteristics.  See 
Appendix Table A1.  These regressions only include students either in a school that has implemented 
whole-school reform for three or four years or in a comparison school. 
 
 
Table A1.  Value-added Production Functions Estimates for Fifth-Graders in 1997 and 1999,  
with Heckman Selection Correction 
 
 SDP MES SFA 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
N 12,809 12,809 11,465 11,465 10,772 10,772 
Uncensored Observations 8,261 8,261 6,899 6,899 6,393 6,393 
I. The Production Function       
Adopted Whole-School Reform 0.025 0.535 -0.011 -0.425 -2.170** -1.990 
[Standard error] [0.717] [1.174] [0.631] [1.752] [0.610] [1.969] 
Individual Characteristics       
Year=1999 -0.228 -0.241 -2.085 -2.041 -1.426 -1.384 
Lagged Test-Score 0.643** 0.643** 0.627** 0.627** 0.629** 0.627** 
Lagged Test-Score if >50 0.036** 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 0.036** 0.038** 
Lagged Test-Score*Year=1999 -0.009 -0.009 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.032 
Lagged Test-Score if >50*Year=1999 -0.022 -0.022 -0.041** -0.041** -0.039** -0.039** 
Female 0.700** 0.711** 0.924 2.496** 0.967** 0.942** 
Asian (reference category is white) 5.795** 5.106** 4.042 -25.392 1.371 1.100 
Hispanic (reference category is white) -0.996 -1.086 -1.154 -0.998 -0.996 -1.083 
Black (reference category is white) -2.279** -2.251** -2.301 -2.287** -1.798** -1.831* 
Free Lunch Eligible -1.390** -1.273** -1.395 2.797 -0.946 -0.869 
Eligible for ESL Servicesa  -1.252 -1.598 -2.164 -17.170 -3.626** -3.719** 
Lamba (Inverse Mills Ratio) -2.000 -0.823 0.264 63.027 6.396** 6.964 
School Characteristics       
Log of Enrollment*10 0.136 0.153 0.306* 0.311** 0.159* 0.151* 
% Free Lunch 0.023 0.025 0.039 0.042 0.063 0.060 
% Limited English Proficient 0.023 0.016 -0.015 -0.009 0.028 0.024 
% Hispanic -0.023 -0.020 -0.007 -0.007 -0.016 -0.016 
% Teachers <2 yrs experience -0.061 -0.058 -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 
% Teachers w/certification 0.011 0.014 0.038 0.040 0.084* 0.079 
Average Class-Size -0.064 -0.071 -0.265* -0.274* -0.066 -0.050 
SURRb -0.655 -0.715 -0.982* -0.884 -0.391 -0.476 
II. The Selection Equationc       
Female 0.030 0.044** 0.031 
Asian  -0.822** -0.722** -0.567** 
Free Lunch Eligible 0.140 0.117 0.186** 
Eligible for ESL Servicesa  -0.361** -0.397** -0.335** 
Home-Language Other than English -0.278** 0.005 -0.193** 
* Significant at the 0.10 level.  ** Significant at the 0.05 level.  All inferences based on robust standard errors.  
a.  =1 if student was eligible for English as Second Language (ESL) services during the previous school year, 0 otherwise. 
b. =1 if school was under registration review during the outcome year, 0 otherwise. 
c. This panel gives results for the first-stage regressions in the Heckman-selection procedure for each reform program. 
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